Thinking/writing
today’s commentary in the stream of
[beginning
with “Bird Song,” which will be repeated several times and the probably jumping
to “Estimated Prophet”…]
Before
taking up the writing from 12/19/04 I want to make a ‘correction’ to something
I wrote yesterday, and then complete a promissory note that I had wanted to
write yesterday. But first, I want to
remind myself to follow-up in the not to distant future with Tyson, with whom I
just spoke. His project is taking off
and he has big plans to unveil in the new year, and I won’t spoil it by talking
specifics of it here. [nb: I’ve
written some critical notes on Tyson’s ‘study’ project here and there in this
blog – he is mentioned no fewer than 14 times -- and he was also featured in a video we
recorded at PES Albuquerque on March 15h that was posted here http://duartebeinglearning.blogspot.com/2014/03/eduardo-m-duarte-hofsra-u-being-20.html]
When the time comes I’ll address the next stage in the ongoing evolution of his
study project, perhaps here if this blog is still going on after I complete my
last commentary in February. Specifically,
I want to return to engage him further on the description of his Agambenian
‘impotentiality’ through what today sounded to me like a version of Heidegger’s
geleassenheit, or the will to
non-willing, or willing non-willing (on ‘willing non-willing’ cf. OPM 146-148,
July 10-12th). In recent
weeks my own project has come into greater focus and the learning
(specifically, the work of the learning community) has been described via technē as realization. Talk of realization and actualization
continue to amplify for me a critique of ‘impotentiality’ as what I now have
come to understand is something of a existential decision that is quite
distinct and almost emerges in dialectical contrast to the decisive decision
that is made via enactment. Of course, study as Tyson is describing it, is a form of enactment: the enactment of
indecision, or decision not to decide and to live under the
maxim of “I prefer not to.” Setting
aside what sounds to me live the voice of privilege that I hear in that maxim –
who but one with class privilege can act on their ‘preferences’? – I am mostly
interested in the question of ontology, which is to say the kind of power that
is operating in that act of the will not to will. I have described the situation of learning
as moving within the Open, that place where we ‘are’ after
self-overcoming. The will not to will
constitutes the end of the ‘self’ and the closure of metaphysics. It is also the beginning of the movement
into learning. And here is where I
perceive the moment of transcendence that I have been describing the past few
days: the horizontal movement towards
the other(s) – the movement into the movement [community] -- that is moved from without, that is moved by
a force is accepted and through the
embrace of that power the self is overcome.
What we have here is the arrival of koinōnia
in that moment that we encountered in Bach’s St. John Passion
Befördre den Lauf
Selbst an mir zu
ziehen,
Und höre nicht
auf,
zu schieben,
zu bitten.
Bring me on my way
And do not cease
to pull,
to push,
to urge me on
and
with Luke “if You
are willing, remove this cup from Me; yet not My will, but Yours be done.”
(22:42)
--
[skipped “Promised Land” and jumped to Scarlett>Fire, that begins with
Garcia’s acoustic effect, which more or less resuscitated “Scarlett Begonias”
in the ‘90s] --
So,
indeed, as I promised Tyson, I need to return to engage in a careful critique
of the existential situation of
impotentiality, which, in the
end, may complement what I have been describing as the preparatory work of meditation and
meditative thinking. But I suspect this
is not the case. Rather, it seems to me that if impotentiality is disclosed
through an act of the will then it is even more problematic and incompatible
with the project I am describing, the project that emerges from
‘self-overcoming’ and the closure of metaphysics, which is to say, the
dissolution of the will. When Arendt (in
the first volume of the Life of the Mind)
follows Heidegger into the phenomenology of thinking, she does so through those
epigrams that announce the will depleted modality of thinking. I note this because, in the end, the
phenomenology of learning that I have been working out is a phenomenology of
thinking, which is to say, learning is thinking and thinking is learning. Of
course, that’s just the most fundamental of claims, one that organizes the
phenomenology and does so by insisting
each and every moment of description that takes up the questions concerning
‘thinking’ and ‘learning’, questions that are always ways of phrasing the
question concerning our fundamental confusion regarding Being. That
is the fundamental question as
existential situation, as the fundamental
question forcing and propelling all further questions concerning ‘thinking’ and
‘learning,’ which is to say, forcing and propelling the phenomenology. In sum, it is a state of perplexity that is
always already rendering impotent our will to knowledge and, when we recognize
and embrace that perplexity, emancipates us to learning and thinking. A
realization follows from this, and by this I do not mean an epiphany, but
actualization. We are made, we become real, we become whole,
not to mention holy. That is, we become homo sacer, which, from the perspective of the State denotes
philosophy (learning as thinking, thinking as learning) as ‘accursed,’ but from
within that ‘third space’ (DuBois mapping of education outside the State and
Market) of the learning community we are sacred.
[nb: after making my way through these
Paul books, I’ll need to pick up a copy of Agamben’s Opus Dei:
An Archeology of Duty, which Tyson mentioned today. When I heard him say “Opus Dei” I heard “work of God”, which is precisely
what it means, but I heard it in the
context in the description of the work
of the learning community, the poetic dialogic work, learning as making, as the
making of community, as the mimetic enactment of the originary creative act of
Being’s Becoming, as the making that is organized via koinōnia. [nb:
this time of writing is getting away from me…and so I’ll have to postpone until
tomorrow the promissory note I wanted to write regarding a moment in
Gutierrez’s ninth chapter “Liberation and Salvation,” specifically in the
sections “Political Liberation: Self-Creation of Man,” and “Salvation:
Re-Creation and Complete Fulfillment.”]
That brings me to a correction of
an epiphany I had yesterday when listening to “Uncle John’s Band” from 12/18/93
-- [can one ‘correct’ what is revealed
in an epiphany? Certainly not!...or
perhaps? -- “Don’t worry about me, no; I
aint in no hurry” -- now that is a rhythmic description that I would use as
a replacement “I prefer not to”, because it qualifies the movement as not
entirely linear, as swinging to and fro --]
So not necessarily a ‘correction’ to the epiphany, but an
amendment. I was so sure “Uncle John”
was John the Gospelist and shared that with Kelly later who, after dinner, was
singing along with the performance from 12/18/93. “Really?” she responded. “Sounds to me like John the Baptist? I was reading about him just the other
day.” “Of course!” -- “Come here Uncle
John’s band by the riverside….” I
stand corrected, or amended. Such is the
mysterious and improvisational flow of learning via dialogue!
Finally, a word on what I
proclaimed yesterday as the subtitle of the PES Memphis 2015: The Masked
Philosophy Conference. First, I recall
the CFP (the call) that was made in
March, at the PES meeting in Albuquerque http://www.philosophyofeducation.org/2014/2015-call-papers
Yesterday I was reminded of that
moment in the CFP when I cite Foucault, from the interview he gave to Le Monde in April, 1980, that is titled
“The Masked Philosopher,” in Ethics: Subjectivity
and Truth (the last selection in the volume):
“There is no sovereign
philosophy, it’s true, but a philosophy or rather a philosophy in
activity. The movement by which, not
without effort and uncertainty, dreams and illusions, one detaches oneself from what is accepted as true and seeks
other rules – that is philosophy. The
displacement and transformation of frameworks of thinking, the changing of
received values and all the work that has been done to think otherwise, to do
something else, to become other than what one is – that too is philosophy.”
Here is the context from the PES
Memphis CFP for that citation of Foucault:
Making Philosophy,
and Delivering the Good(s) to the Absent Monarch
By framing the conference around the blues and soul music,
and emphasizing our gathering as a showcase for the ways we make philosophy of education, my
interest, as program chair, is to encourage papers and proposals that express
an experimental spirit, and understand our meeting as an occasion to exhibit
new theoretical and conceptual strategies, novel discursive forms, alternative
ways of approaching perennial questions and authoritative figures, as well as
bold initiatives for organizing the way we gather to share and support the work
of philosophy of education. I am inviting anyone who will be
submitting papers, and alternative session proposals to understand our
gathering as not just ‘another’ PES, but as philosophical event or happening,
as a moment in what late Ilan Gur Ze’ev described as an Orcha: “an improvised moment that is to find/create its own
destiny.”
At this point the program is
coming into form, and this is happening with the same force that brought the
CFP into being! I have arrived at a
full draft of the program – all in pencil at the moment – in terms of papers
and alternative sessions. It’s very
early in the game, and there are respondents to be named, as well as session
chairs. And as I moved into that part
of the planning I was returned to Foucault’s interview and to his proposal that
we play a game: “year without a name.”
I am proposing that in anticipation of PES Memphis 2015 that we
experiment with a new form for how we do
philosophy of education, for how we make
PES, and thus I will send the submitted drafts to selected respondents without the author’s name attached. They, in turn, will write their response
without divulging their name. And then I will create a conference program without names! The only names will be
the ones that list the review team, committees, Frank the President, etc., as
well as our invited speakers, out of respect.
This is what I wrote to one team member yesterday when I announced my
intention to play this game with PES Memphis 2015 (I then sent it out via
Twitter):
“fyi: i'm trying an experiment with my respondents. I'm
calling it the "masked philosopher experiment" (you know that piece
by Foucault?). basically, I'm not going to reveal the identity of the
authors to the respondents, nor am i going to inform the author of the person
responding to them. I'm very interested to see how it turns out.
I've always wondered about Foucault's proposal and this is my opportunity
to enact a version of it. So you can right as if it were whomever you
think it may be…or just respond without imagining the person….whatever works
for you!”
And here is a citation from “The
Masked Philosopher” Foucault interview:
“Why did I suggest that we use
anonymity? Out of nostalgia for a time
when, being quite unknown, what I
said had some chance of being
heard. With the potential reader,
the surface of contact was unrippled.
The effects of the book might
land in unexpected places and form shapes
that I had never thought of. A
name makes reading too easy.
I shall propose a game: that of
the "year without a name." For a year,
books would be published without
their authors' names. The critics
would have to cope with a mass of
entirely anonymous books.”
And that all leads to concluding by way of citing 12/19/04, this day, ten years ago, as the meditation got underway by returning to the East, and in a deeply
ecumenical moment I wrote: “Learning is the ongoing reception of the sublime
that awakens be-ing with the Being of beings.
Above, we encountered this name for attunement as ‘Buddha’ or ‘the
capacity to wake up and understand things as they are….’ This ‘wide awakeness,’ we said, is maintained
and cultivated in the dialogic relationship where the ‘self’ is relinguished
and the ‘nonself’ (anatman) co-arises…bearing
the stamp of anitya
(impermance). Above [earlier in the year
of daily writing!], we emphasized why this bearing is an ‘en-actment’ of anitya, and why learning is an ‘experiential
philosophy.’ En-actment, which figures
more prominently here as we move toward our final reflections on learning and
focus on the aesthetic [artistic] way
of learning, unfolds as the response to Being’s appeal.”(BL 314)
3.0 (Thursday, Portland, Maine). Received some emails from my editors at Routledge, and "LEARN" is movin forward! They offered some alternative titles, which I like and hoping they will go with my combined version: "Learn - The Dialectic of a Philosophical Education: A New Phenomenology - tolle lege!" They also produced an excellent blurb for the book: This book provides an account, both theoretical and phenomenological, of the education offered by philosophy. Specifically, it examines the three distinct moments that make up the practice of philosophy: reading, writing, and discussion. By considering each moment in turn, the author explores how philosophical learning creates opportunities for what Hannah Arendt described as “the gift of thinking poetically” and suggests that the dynamic and nonlinear relationship between these moments is what constitutes the dialectic of a philosophical education.
ReplyDeleteGrounded in years of practice and offering scholarly commentary throughout, this shortform book will appeal to students and philosophers of education, as well as those with interests in teaching and learning more broadly." So far so good!
3.0b - As for the resonances of the writing/thinking from 10/20 years ago and today, the one that jumps out is the fragment from Foucault's "Masked Philosopher," which became a central part of the experimental PES 2015 Memphis program that I organized. Here is the resonance of that important moment from Foucault in "LEARN": For most students the fate of a book’s freedom may seem uncanny. How can a book be neither finished or unfinished? In what sense is the author dead? Shouldn’t we expect that the teacher will explain to us what we’ve read? All of these are questions that emerge from the habits developed by schooling. In turn, before they are invited to go into the studio of philosophical learning, my students are invited to reflect on how they’ve been taught to read, both fiction and non-fiction. They often report that schooling instructed them to read as if the text were a set of fixed ideas. And they had been warned against so-called subjectivism, that a unique encounter with the text was “wrong,” and not as “true” as the explanation the teacher would offer. How strange it is when they read Foucault telling them that in order to learn philosophically they must avoid the trap set by the fallacy of schooling that the goal of study is to know the definitive truth and meaning of a text: “There is no sovereign philosophy, it’s true, but a philosophy or rather a philosophy in activity. The movement by which, not without effort and uncertainty, dreams and illusions, one detaches oneself from what is accepted as true and seeks other rules – that is philosophy.” Philosophy, Foucault reminds students, is not the expression of a singular sovereign voice, mortal or immortal, but a polyphonic and dialogic activity. Philosophical study is demanding, Foucault insists, and the challenge for the student is to take up a book as if they did not know the author: “Why did I suggest that we use anonymity? Out of nostalgia for a time when, being quite unknown, what I said had some chance of being heard. With the potential reader, the surface of contact was unrippled. The effects of the book might land in unexpected places and form shapes that I had never thought of. A name makes reading too easy.” In this way, philosophical study can be the action of detaching oneself from what is accepted, what is normative, and what is reproduced by schooling. Foucault’s philosophy in activity offers an account of a kind study that negates schooling and suspends its established values and norms that reinforce the authority of the know-it-all. As a philosopher of the archive, Foucault demonstrates that study is most active when picking up and reading the dusty tomes that remain mostly unread, and whose authors are unknown, strangers to the reader. Figuratively speaking, the deconstructed library and its collection of illegible books is akin to Foucault’s archive.
ReplyDelete"In a soundless language, the work would be said in silence. Its real “tell,” its truth in painting, state it as effective to overcome any reading, to exceed any apparent fullness of meaning, as a requirement that would force the recognition of radical illegibility. Any interpretation of the work would be forced to work endless, because its nature belongs to the order of writing that resists the temptation to bring the production of meaning schemes of any stable economy. Just as that resistance becomes embodied - absolute materiality and soundless-we would hear about the truth of the work. Noli me legere could be then its motto." José Luis Brea, 2007, “Noli me legere,” read online: www.cendeac.net/en/editorial/catalogo/6.