With this paper I am
moving precariously close to the thema
probandum, and not because I have an argument determined beforehand and in
writing this paper I am merely working from an outline, or a set of notes, and
thereby not actually proceeding via phenomenology. Of course, were I to do so I would only be
endangering the duty to myself insofar as I would be risking the integrity of
the philosophical project and its phenomenological methodology that I have set
for myself. To you, my audience (my
reader, or those listening to me read this paper), however, this danger matters
not at all. Indeed, from your
perspective the matter has already been
settled insofar as I am at this point offering you a completed draft, a
composed piece. Well, I’m presuming
this to be the case, because at this point I have only completed an
introduction/overview that is only a promise; again first and foremost to
myself. (It’s an odd thing to be
writing a paper of philosophy that one hopes to read at a conference. But I digress. Or do I?)
Excerpt
from Introduction to the paper I shared with my Philo of Ed class for next
week’s seminar: Feeling the Funk:
Taking Up Nietzsche’s Prophecy of a Music-Making Philosophy GV-7.
Society for the Philosophical Study of Education; Friday Evening, 2/28/14:
7:00–10:00 p.m. The 111th meeting of the American Philosophical
Association Central Division Chicago, Palmer House Hilton Hotel
I
would like to plead innocent and blame last night’s commentary writing on what
my Paris Farmers Union calendar is calling the Full Beaver Moon, and that’s not
necessarily a far-fetched excuse for the writing that commentary writing that happened
yesterday, first, on the campus to train bus, then on the LIRR, continued on
the Air Train, and was completed while I was eating dinner at my usual spot in
JB Terminal 5 at JFK, where I always order the paella, and catch-up with Ken
the waiter/bar tender. By the time I
was done with the commentary I felt a certain sense of unease, even though the
food was excellent, as always. Again,
I’d like to blame it on the full moon, or the strange mix of exhaustion and
stimulation that arrives around the 16th hour of a 19 hour day. But those are excuses, perhaps legitimate,
to explain, and even defend, the somewhat discombobulated quality of the
thinking/writing that went down. Once I
found myself in the modality of Kerouacian free jazz beat writing – something I
did a bit of in July in the wake of reading Big
Sur -- I just went for it. That’s how it has to go down, as I’ve been
telling students and colleagues alike, using Heraclitus’ war fragments as my
example. Once you are there in the situation and modality you
can’t run and hide or freak out. You
just have to write in the voice that speaking at that moment, and yesterday it
was a most informal expression of the Augustinian self-disclosure; informal,
mostly, because I didn’t and couldn’t do any of the heavy lifting that he does,
especially in the last four books (10-13), when he ‘gets over himself’ or ‘gets
through himself’ and moves into the Godhead.
What I did try to do in the commentary was account for the return of
singularity, the first person, the persona first, that voice that I usually
attribute with Kierkegaard – who taught me about becoming an author, and being
an apostle. But in this past week of teaching and learning with my students and
colleagues I realize how much of this is also coming from Augustine, and also
Paul, whose epistles are these wonderful philosophical treatises on the
conversion, community and congregation; written by powerful self that is at the
same time a diminished self, a self that has been overcome. The return of the first person in my
thinking/writing stand in stark contrast to the original meditations and Being and Learning. The meditations and Being and Learning is written in the third person, and I’m tempted
to say ‘problematically written in the third person’, but I’ll resist that kind
of critique; there was, is, and will remain in the future to write in the third
person, which is the traditional voice of philosophy, more or less. I say ‘more or less’ because all of the
noteworthy thinkers/writers were noteworthy precisely because they expressed a
powerfully distinctive voice. [More
accurate is the description of the writing in Being and Learning would identify it as vacillating between the
third person and the first person plural, but never in the first person
singular.] But today the first person is
the compelling voice, in part, because it answers the question concerning the
overwhelming force of the learning community, the difference eclipsing power of
koinonia. The important counter-example, which I have
explored in these pages (cf. OPM 245 & 246) is the event of Pentecost,
where the Holy Spirit disrupts what can be identified as the parochial and
private and ‘exclusive’ gathering of the apostles and disperses them into the
streets of Jerusalem with the disparate strange voices that are not their
own. But in that moment we don’t
witness the re-turn of the first person, but the momentary disaggregation of
the congregation; the return of plurality, which is not the same as
singularity. Plurality is made up of
singularity, as Arendt tells us. And
this means singularity is always prior and originary vis-à-vis plurality, but
not necessarily vis-à-vis the learning community. And this is precisely the matter I have been
thinking/writing about for the past few days: in what sense is singularity
present or appearing in the learning community?
This is a question raised by Paul, for sure. But
when we make the Augustinian and Kierkegaardian turn, the question
vanishes, especially with the latter who is deeply suspicious of community and
congregation. The Augustine of the Confessions seems to think that question
is outside of his concerns; he brackets it because he is working within the
interior landscape via memory. He too is
confronting the problem of singularity, of course, and the problem is the very
ontological status of the singular self.
On the one hand the self is divided against itself (will v. thinking, or
mind v. heart, reason v. faith, etc.), and in being divided the self is not
fully with God, although the Holy
Spirit is always with him and in him. As Arendt insisted, singularity is always a
matter of harmony, a harmony of the self.
And she cites Socrates from Plato’s Gorgias
to make this point: “better that I be in discordance with everyone, so long as
I am in harmony with myself.” For
Socrates, of course, we do need others to help us achieve that harmony. And this has always been the crux of my move
to the dialogic learning community. For
Augustine, however, we have to work it out on our own…with the help of God, of
course, but mostly through thinking/writing, prayer and contemplation…on our
own. Singularity appears in the work
we do…on our own.
The
question of singularity can also be phrased as the question of subjectivity,
and when its phrased in this way I am able to more easily demonstrate why the
question is a difficult one for me, and why Augustine poses me with an enormous
challenge. The first line of the
meditation from this day ten years ago shows the nature of the challenge:
“Freedom, then, is realized in the face-to-face inter-action of
inter-subjectivity.”(11/7/04 BL
) [Encounter the word ‘freedom’
reminds me that I had intended to make a connection between Augustine’s first
person confessional writing and writing of Frederick Douglass in his work My Bondage and My Freedom, which was
waiting for me on my desk when I returned home last night. I had ordered the book last week after
discovering that Douglass had visited Maine and spoken at what is now Bates
College. Now, after a week of studying
Paul’s letter to the Galatians, and its complex slave discourse, I’m receiving Douglass’
writing within a much larger hermeneutic horizon!] With the opening line of the meditation from
this day it is clear that I am deeply ambivalent about our capacity to resolve
the question of subjectivity and even to think through the question of the
divided self on our own. And it is not just a matter of ‘making
progress,’ but of the quality and power of the experience of working it out on our own. What is the quality and force of the
learning happening on our own? If we are talking through the concept of
‘freedom’ it strikes me as an example of ‘negative liberty,’ that ‘freedom
from’ others that is held up by liberals and libertarians. For a congregationist like myself, that is a
weak form of freedom. What’s more, I
make the claim that the inter-action of inter-subjectivity is the existential
manifestation of the ontological “‘free flowing’ movement of the essential
sway. The learning community is enjoined…[by] the most subtle rhythm…”(11/07/04
BL 265)
The
question of singularity and/or subjectivity is jettisoned at the onset, as soon
as the learner emerges from the preparatory modality of the novitiate/apprentice. The movement across the threshold and into
the Open is marked by a self-overcoming that is an overcoming of the self as a
singularity subject. Inter-subjectivity
arises from the modality of the diminished act of subjectivity, the servitude
toward the other that happens by way of listening. “We call such standing with the movement of
the essential sway ‘compassionate listening’, for this modality of the ones who
remain steadfast in this standing [moving with the subtle rhythm] is the comportment of the ones who have taken
up the learning of close listening. Such
learning marks the attunement to the other, the attentiveness that occurs with
the diminishment of ‘self.’”(11/7/04 BL
265)
3.0 (Thursday, Portland, ME) Yesterday, in the wake of the Presidential election, I shared, for the first and probably the only time, a fragment from "LEARN" with the extended group text appropriately named "La Familia." I will post that fragment here because it also addresses the relation between listening, learning and freedom, which was taken up on this day 20 years ago today and cited in the fragments that were posted above in the 2.0 commentary: "Freedom, then, is realized in the face-to-face inter-action of inter-subjectivity.”(11/7/04 BL ) And: "the inter-action of inter-subjectivity is the existential manifestation of the ontological ''free flowing’ movement of the essential sway. The learning community is enjoined…[by] the most subtle rhythm…'(11/07/04 BL 265)". And here is the fragment from "LEARN" that I shared with la familia yesterday: "Adorno and Horkheimer’s devastating critique of the Enlightenment as a failed ideology that produced “instrumental reasoning” is largely a failure of hearing, of properly listening to the call of philosophical learning: aude sapere (have the courage to think). Perhaps this Wahlspruch of philosophical enlightenment can respond to the rise of fascism? If we truly listen to the instruction and enact courage and audacity with respect to learning itself, we will find ourselves relocated in the place of study, which is to say, in the place of thinking. This is a place of solitude, where the learner is together with the significant object, the work of art. It takes courage to study, to be alone, and to eliminate all distractions and focus entirely on the book/text. But this is what philosophical study as studia liberalia inspires by inviting the student to be with the liber (book) and thereby be-with liber (freedom), emancipated from the order of schooling. Such learning enacts thinking in the Arendtian sense, and as such is a negation of instrumental reason and ‘outcomes’ teleology of schooling. While there is no guaranteed ‘result’ beyond the experience of being-with liber, in light of Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique it is worth reiterating the question raised by Arendt: “Could the activity of thinking as such, the habit of examining whatever happens to come to pass or to attract attention, regardless of results and specific content, could this activity be among the conditions that make [people] abstain from evil-doing and even actually ‘condition’ them against it?” (LM, 5) Perhaps the solitude of study can inoculate a student from the virus of herd mentality, and from the scourge of fascism. Perhaps the well-being of autonomy is an aspect of the provecho of solitude when the student is liberated into a phenomenological relation with the significant object of study."
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